NOTE:  Robb DeWall interview with Ron Stephenson, County Commissioner at the time of the flood.
       (Documents preserved as a text duplication with strikouts and hand written comments removed.)

RON STEPHENSON TAPES: Interview 9-9-72 page 1 of tape 1


DEWALL:The first question I want to ask you is were there every any official
warnings such as sirens to the community in advance of the flood?

STEPHENSON:There were no sirens that I know about, but as far as official warnings there were official warnings done by the sheriff's department, fire
department and police department.

DEWALL: What time?

STEPHENSON: These times I'm not really sure of, because I wasn't involved at that stage of the flood.

DEWALL: Early evening?

STEPHENSON: Yes, they started at around 6:30 or in this area, now you"ll be able
to determine this exactly when you talk to city officials. they have that.

DEWALL: But what form did they take?

STEPHENSON: They would have taken the form of radio announcements of tv
announcements when thos started; and going out to such as the school where i
was, going out to the Stevens school and warning the people there, and any
public function where they went in and announced, and where they went to the
homes themselves in the flood area and spread out and gave the flood information.

This was primarily done by the National Guard, the police department and the
fire deparment, the sheriff-s office.

DEWALL: Now this is later in the evening...after 10 or...

STEPHENSON: Yes, it actually started really strongly around 8 with REACT
people involved.

DEWALL: Your comment is interesting because we at KOTA were never notified
by local police until wayafter 10 o*clock, and the only communication we
had was through the state highway patrol, and that was for a long time .just
for outlying areas. In your opinion were the early radio and tv bulletins on the
developing flood threat adequate?

STEPHENSON:Well I don't want to blame anyone, but strictly from the standpoint
of the warning it ~vas not, and in my opinion it could be changed and improved.
And, in this way: first we have to get more accurate and more intelligent
information to the media in an official capacity. We must decide ahead of time
who has the right to give this official information in other words there would
have to be more than one and would have to be places where media could get
confirmation quickly if they were't sure because  you could throw the
community into panic if someone just flagrantly called up and said well there's
a wall of water coming down a certain canyon. We had this happen the following
week or so. And I would say the most important thing is we in civil defense
sit down now, and now's the time to do that--~we've been waiting until our
new director is named because we feel he should be involved in this planning--
and there's a pretty remote chance of a flood this time of the year, and ~we
felt this could be delayed until that time, and until more recovery things are
done. In other words our time now is spent mostly on recovery and federal
programs and so on. Now we have to sit down in this next month and really
determine this warning system. How it could be best handled and who should be
responsible for it. I have some ideas as to what I think about it, but that will
be determined by a group board action.

STEPHENSON TAPES...page 2 of tape 1

DEWALL: But you feel that the early warnings, say from 6:30 to 8:30 were
not adequate on radio and television?

STEPHENSON: If radio and television wasn’t notified until 10 o.clock, then
obviously it wasn.t accurate, it 'wasn’t good.After 10 o'clock the streamers,
in my opinion, were of no value or of  very little value.

DEWALL: You mean the crawl across the TV screen?

STEPHENSON: The crawl across the screen. The people, many. many. many of them .
I personally interviewed. said they didn't even notice it, or pay any attention
to it...especially older people. these are people whose attention must be gotten
because they have lived many, many years and they’re used to the safety and the
"it never happened before type thing." ,

DEWALL: You think we should have interrupted the TV programming with a vocal
bulletin?

STEPHENSON: Yes. And I'm not saying this is anybody's fault. With all of the
things that happened, I"m certainly not infering that, because who knew at that
time, but I think in the future we would be remiss if we didn't set up a
program where on any emergency say a tornado or fire an explosion a bad
accident, for instance a bomber that might crash in Rapid City in an area
that might be heavily populated or anything that might cause or create
risk to larger numbers of people above the capaicty of the normal capacity
of the sheriff's office or police department to cope with. And in these cases
I would think that a warning should be given, the program should be stopped,
the announcer should give the information and this should be done in a very
strong, aggressive, but not panicy way. And I think that this would be wise for
the media to have test trys on this privately in their own organizations. In
other words you have to take into complete consideration your staff that
is on duty. who would have this responsibility. because it's a responsible
spot to give somthing of this natures on radio or on TV. and I think that this
is a problem within the media, and at the time we're ready to discuss this I
intend to call a meeting of all the media that would be involved in that
and have an open discussion on this and come up with some ideas.

DEWALL:Ron, how extensive was the communications black-out in the city during
the period from midnight until dawn?

STEPEHENSON: You’d have to get that from telephone and power companies, I don't
know those exact figures.

DEWALL: from the civil defense standpoint, why the delay in getting the EBS on the
air after the KOTA po~ver failure?

STEPHENSON: This is a very important thing, something I’ve looked into. I'
I've talked with Mr. Boreman at WCCO in Minneapolis, and he's very concerned
about this. He's been very active in civil defense and certainly the EBM.
I believe that!we should immediately install at either civil defnese or state
and county expence~or both an immeidate automatic switch to power so that we don't
have this delay again in getting on the air after a power outage.We had a
couple of hour delay, and only the fact I think that Stu Steele was in the
control headquarters and helped to getus back on again...with his help. I mean
his liason, I don't know how much technical experience he has in this area,but
he did a good job in getting us going. And, it seems to me I was back on
again in about two hours. I don't know exactly. You'd have those figures. I'd
like to know in fact.

STEPHENSON TAPES...page 3 of tape 1

DEWALL: Who has the responsibility to make the decision that EBS would be used?

STEPHENSON: I think this should be automatic. I think when power goes out at the
radio station at the transmitter when their power goes out...ours always is on,
we have automatic power at the courthouse at civil defense...the minute that's
automatic...

DEWALL: In any kind of situation whether an emergency or not?

STEPHENSON: Well.I think it wouldprobably. I don't know how you're going to tell.
How are you going to know when this happens. I think that it should be anytime'.
Because disasters don't go by timetables or clock or anything else. We assume
that when power goes out there's got to be some reason for that power going out.
It's probably some kine of an emergency. It might be a car hitting a post 
and knocking it out but I can't see it would be any deterrent or harm if you're
not officially on the air, if you don't have an announcer out there or something.
What differnce is it going to make really? But have it there and have it available
for us there. I would think it would be very valuable. Here's another thing:
that enters my mind. You have certain numbers of people what would go out there
and get things hooked up. Okay, I'd like to know how much effort does it take?
Eor example say something happens after your normal sign-off time. Your man has
left the station, you have nobody there. How do we get you back on the air if
that man iskilled or that man is delayed or he can't get to the station? or
the transmitter. How do we get on the air again from civil defense headquarters
automatically? This is something I think we ought to look at. I don't know
if it can be done technically, but I think  it's something that ought to be looked
into. Because you can’t determine just as our Civil Defense Director couldn't
be here he was not here on the job where we needed him, so how do we know your
technicians will be avaiable. or who. or who determines this? It wouldn"t
matter how much capability we had if we can't get it turned on and get it going.
Then we can't produce. This is something we have to take a look at.
And Boreman was concerend about this. They are on 24 hours a day so they don't
have that problem, but I'm sure many stations aren't.

DEWALL: But they could still have a power failure and be knocked off as wewere?

STEPHENSON: well, no they're automatic. Just as Soon as they loose their power
they switch over...just like the hospital does. they have an automatic switch on.

DEWALL:was the EBS the only source of information in the city during the critical
rescue and recovery operation on the lOth?

STEPHENSON: well it was only way we had to get to the public. We had other forms
of communication such as REACT that were scattered all over.  We had police and
sheriff's office and some help from ham radio...

DEWALL: but in terms of public information...

STEPHENSON: Public information. the only thing you had was EBM.

DEWALL:The other stations were all off the air?

STEPHENSON: They were off  as far as our being able to make a public
announcement. Now we tied up, you know you don't 'want to tie up your phones
too much, but after the first day KIMM got back on the air or they were on the
air I think, but we had a direct line to them. We tried to make it fair.

DEWALL: But during the critical period EBS was exclusively on the air?

STEPHENSON: That's the only one.

DEWALL:  There were other  stations taking the EBS feed I understand. Does this have merit?

STEPHENSON TAPES. ...page 4 of tape 1 

STEPHENSON: I don't know, if that  was done it was done by KOTA. We didn-
authorize that...and I’ll be real honest, I have some mixed emotions about
that. Much information that is directly concerned locally it's not always 
good to have that information go out to a wide extent. For instance, I'm talking
about clothing. we wereappealing for certain things on a local basis, and when
people hear  this all over the US and the world, why I surpose our appeal
gave the impression we were in a real critical situation--and no question we were"
by this time, everybodywas getting aware of the immensness of it. But they
misinterpreted it to the point that tons and tons of clothing and things came in
that created an additional problem for us  that we weren't able to cope with.
NA place to put it or store it and how do you turn off compassion. You don'
want to turn it off, you want these peopel to understand we need their help,
but when you've got all the clothing you need, you don't need tons and tons more
of it. Just something that causes a tremendous problem. We were able to take care
of it by a fantastic effort by Ellsworth Air Force Base, Salvation Army and
volunteers, they just simply dug in an inventoried it and took care of it.
But many times we'd have to hold trucks at Mitchell or Sioux Falls or Utah.
People got the wrong impression then, they felt we weren't concerned, we don't
want their help. We need it, but in a direction that will help us. 
We need to control what goes out so they don't just send all clothing for example.
or not all like at one time we had plentyof certain things and yet they still
were pouring in.  and had we been able to a little bit getter organize this.
Now this is partly our own fault as we should have had someone at civil defense
who could do this at the very beginning--like Henry Baker took this job of the
coordination down there of this particular thing--we had one person in charge
of all this material that was coming in. Now he had the complete picture, but
when we have the Mayor making calls or myself making calls over the radio and
then somebody else, maybe Ellsworth of Salvation Army of Red Cross and all of
them not coordinated very ,well. This is something in the future you could have
all planned out ahead of time.

DEWALL: At the height of the emergency--say noon on June lOth--how many persons
would you say were involved in the command post in the courthouse in the civil
defense headquarters.

STEPHENSON: at the height, you mean the morning of Saturday. Oh. I'd say there
Were, well, you know, if you don't take your police andsheriff operating out of
Here, also the recovery operation of bodies and the identification operation
was working out of there. Later we dispersed some of this througout the courthouse.
I think maybe what you're saying to me is at the command post we probably had
15 to 20 people in authoritiative positions who could use the hot line phones
who used for instance the sheriff and  chief of police...

DEWALL: Directing how many volunteers and workers in the field?

STEPHENSON: Oh. thousands. We were moving 19-hundred in the guard along, and all
that direction came right out of that control down there through the national
guard.

DEWALL: In the absence of the Civil Defense Director. who was in charge or what
was the chain of command.

STEPHENSON: This just happened. I happened to get there and was working with
the sheriff's office with a deputy out on rescue operations. warning actually.
I was caught down here at Omaha and West Boulevard just off a block up. And we
were taking people out of those trailers and so on, and the way it hit was when
we got caught we had to wait there until the water went down on Omaha, and we
send down the medium, you know the higher area, and got our car down there. and
then we started rescue operations. people who were burned and going into the
houses and getting some of the people out and so on.

STEPHENSON TAPES...page 5 of tape 1 

STEPHENSON(CON"T):I saw some dead bodies and saw the immensity of it. I saw the 
sheriff there, and I suggested we ought to get back to the headquarts, and he
agreed, and we went back. When we got there, Ron Messerthen cam in and the
fire chief was there, and I think George Behrens was there, and myself, and
I think Don Barnett was there, and the question came up, who was in charge.
Well, Don right away wanted to get out into the action, he wanted to get out
where things were happening and help with what he coudl do out there, and the
sheriff was chairman of the civil defense board. Mr. Irish was not there.
Sheriff being chairman, and of course having experience in all kinds of
rescue efforts, so immediately we said well, Glenn you be the honcho, and I was
to be his assistant because I-was on the civil defense board and I-was a
county official which had some authority through the elective position. What
happened was that Glenn immediately was called into his own action working with
his own deputies and police in enforcement and in rescue leaving me alone to kind
of take it over and run it. Ijust got so because I -was the one there I just
became it. It was just one of those things. Going back, I mean we've learned.
If you want som comments on it and what I think about it, let me tell you this:
We went back throughour official legal program that we have on civil defense,
the book in other words--that I hadn't read--and when you look at it. I was the
logical one to have taken over command. The  reason for it is they recommend
the top county or city, depending on where the disaster takes place, be
the one who has the responsiblity or his designated appointee or whoever
would be invovled down the line, In orhter words, LLOYD St. Pierre. maybe
would have been the one because county super cedes the city in government.
Alright, then LLoyd normally would have been the one normally. But Lloyd was
in the flood disaster, he was in a tree with his family.Walt Taylor is co-chairman
of the county commission, but he was involved. His wife had just had an
operation that day in the hospital, and he was out in the valley and had no way
of getting in, he was in the flood area himself.Consequently, and I was on the
civil defense board, and I did have some experience in civil defense through
knowledge of what when on...where the radios ware and things like this. We
also had a program direct I had worked with in civil defense, our regular
program gal who sets up the program, but she had a bad cold, larengitis. so
bad she couldn't even talk all she could do is whisper. So obviously she
couldn't get on the radio and this type of  thing and really wasn't
qualified for it. And, I suprose because of my background in tv and radio--see
I've had a TV show for almost lO  years of my life and on radio I did
News, weather and sports. I did football boradcasts years ago. so I at least
knew what a microphone was and could feel comfortable there in front of one.
So I think it just kind of got to be because I could do it and was there and had
some authority I got the job. And, as it turns out, add this might be just fluke,
but as it turns out I would have been, had everything been official, I would
have been the logical one to have been selected in the manner of chain of
command.

DEWALL: how then do you assess the performance of EBS during that critical
period on Saturday, June lOth?

STEPHENSON:I don't know how it could have been finer. I don't kno~y how ~ye could
have had better response or I'm sure that as soon as poeple realized that there
was away to get information, and radio of course at least six o'clock in the
morning they knew at five that KOTA comes on. So within a couple of hours of
normal when we went on they could come on and hear through transister radios
and some regular radios and cars.

STEPHENSON TAPES...page 6 of tape 1

DEWALL: Well, do you feel that EBS helped forestall a wider panic in the
community than there already was?

STEPHENSON: Well Ive had people who came up to me who even claim that we saved
their lives even prior to the when KOTA went off the air.

DEWALL: In what way?

STEPHENSON: Well, they heeded the warning and they got out.And then also
when we went on apparently there were still some areas that were still being
flooded down below and areas in which they were able to get out and get going.
And I've had people come up and put their arms around me and say you saved my life.
I don't know if i did. I think maybe they're confused somewhat by things that
have happened since, but how do you answer it.

DEWALL: Did the public respond to specific messages put out over EBS?

STEPHENSON: Excellent.No question. In getting people to ...for instance
if we needed volunteers. We'd ask for volunteers and we’d get them in any
capacity. For the first week we couldn't even handle all the volunteers
who would come in response to radio. This was a lifesaver.

DEWALL: My particular concern is still that day after when things were so
confused.
~
STPEHENSON:Even at that stage, as soon as  people became aware that they
had a communication they used it and they listened. 
I don't think there was a place that had a radio that could use it didn't have
it on. Getting to that stage. one of the recommendations I am going to make
is that a large number of transistor radios be placed at certain places in
the community, for instance at Sioux San. the schools. things of this nature
where people would know they were there for emergency use and the batteries
kept up to date. Because if we could have had even 100 transisotor messages
that night we could have done a lot more becasue we could have communicated
to wide numbers of volunteers who were out there. Because. you know, people
lost a lot of radios in the flood area. You don't think of picking up a radio
when you're trying to save your life.

DEWALL:In this situation, was it helpful to have a familiar voice on that EBS mike?

stephenson: You mean my voice and your voice. No question about it.

DEWALL: someone people knew?

STEPHENSON: No question about it, Rob, and I think  that's very
imporant with you being there and you kowning me and visa versa. There was
a trust that we had. The  minute I needed something I could snap that
switch and you would respond, and I didn't have to baloney around about it
and go up the line someplace. I think it would be wise that those of us in
civil defense who are going to be involved in this in the future, or the
directors or whomever, should know and work out programs and actually have
trials and exercises so that we become completely familiar with  you people
and that  you become familiar with us. Because it's possible
to get a nut on there both down there and both places. and then you really
have a tough communications problem.

STEPHENSON TAPES...page 7 of tape 1

DEWALL: That begs my next question:do you think it's helpful when you got to
EBS that you have a trained professional broadcaster to handle the mike?

STEPHENSON: It's imparative, vitally imparative. If you don’t  have this. Wel;
it's just experience, People respond i"ve found to a calm assured voice on
radio in other words in an emergency like this. In other words if your voice
is gonna be a strained panic and “my God what's happened to us," this would
be terrible. If you take it like it's a business deal this is it, bing! we're
doing this, we're doing that. I think the thing that's come back to me from
many many places is the fact that they really felt we were under control from
the very beginning, and this is what Gen. Corning and all the people in the state
and federalhave very highly congradulated us.

DEWALL: Since I was the mike the first ]3 hours with you and so many others
over there, I want  you to comment on the tone of the broadcast.

STEPHENSON: Well the tone, you understand I never heard the broadcast, I was
on the other end of it. I did have a little portable radio after while on which
we could hear some comments. but I was so busy. I'd have six or eight
people behind me all the time asking. . .this and this.  Only time
I was on the radio, I'd get on radio only when something real important.

DEWALL: I gave a running commentary rather than just interupting rather than
just giving bulletins. Rather a continuous narrative.

STEPHENSON:well you were always...and you were getting your information other
than from us and you were able to perform well, and it was necessary for us also
to hear. there was some confusion at different times on information that was
coming through that wasn't cleared through our emergency controls.

DEWALL: But this was later...

STEPHENSON: Mostly I would say.I don't think it happened as long as you and I
I were working together. Down at the control center. I think I was
practically on it along the first six, eight or 10 hours. I don"t think there
were very many others that you talked to down there were there?

DEWALL: Yes, we had interviews from the  very beginning with many officals.
 
STEPHENSON: Like the sheriff and the mayor and things like that...Did that all
mostly come from our control headquarters? See this is a dream to me, I don't
remember all these things . All I remember was
that I was just going steady, making decisions, buying automobiles, things like
this.

DEWALL: have you been told anecdotes from citizens saying that the early
broadcasts or the EBS had some direct effect on their survivial?

STEPHENSON: no question about that.

DEWALL. WHAT would be the most striking example you've been told.

STEPHENSON: I just...I tell you there's so many I couldn’t answer.
I know so many came Up to me when Mrs. Nixon was out here that day, which
was just a week after the flood and it was fresh in everbody"s mind, I just
about couldn"t get out of there. Just one person after another come up and
put their arms around you and they-d be crying, it affected me so much, I just
I know this was all based on what you're asking me. Actually maybe I should say
this. Maybe from the overal experience of that night being in the public for the
first time after the disaster, it was overwhelming. Just no question they were deeply 
affected, and it all came through radio.
.
RON STEPHENSON TAPE INTERVIEW[Transcript[9-9-72 page on -tape 2

DEWALL: You said that the early warnings on radio and television were not
adequate, but later you said that many people had said radio and television
had saved their lives.

RN: When I said they were*t adequate, I don't think anything is adequate unless
the maximum isn't done at that time, and that that doesn't mean at all that what
they did wasn't good...sure better than not doing anything. But I'm saying
and I'm not
really saying that we could have saved any more lives, I think this
is something we just don't know. I don't think we could ever prove this, but I've
talked to many people who said they sat right through the television thing and
never even saw it. ..never even saw it. (interuption for telephone call)

DEWALL: the  missing list of some 4,000 names was read on KOTA Radio. Was
this effective?

STEPHENSON: Yes, but it never should have been necessary. and I have a report
on that that I will be using.

DEWALL: Was it the broadcasting of names originally of people who were reported
missing that inflated the missing list?

STEPHENSON:RIGHT. What we should have done was to have somebody with an experienced
mind..ah, in  other words, like a lawyer, a guy who's acquainted with questioning.
Now could be a lawyer or  could be a police officer. but what' I'm
saying is there are certain things you need to ask about those people. For
instance:what can you tell me, where was he when he was missing. who was he with,
who are the other people with him. Who do we call to notify to find out, ,who
are the nearest people who know him or should be notified if he should be found.
We had two-thousand names that shouldn*t have been on the list. They came down
on our list. They were done by our girls from calls that came in saying some
body was missing. She wouldn't ask any more questions hardly...maybe a few more.
They'd say, "My dad's gone." and we put the name on the list. Okay.

DEWALL:After you got a varified list, was there the indication there that the
broadcasting of the list would help.

STEPHENSON: Oh. yeah. we knocked off after those broadcasts huge chunks of them
with people calling in.

DEWALL: Ron. I want to talk about the radio-television special on KOTA the Sunday
night after the flood in which all the officials for the first time were brought
together for a live panel discussion  to answer questions called in.

STEPHENSON: That was good. I did't go up to that because I was busy.

DEWALL: I felt it was an important psychological turning point in terrors of
of the public being told for the first time what potential there was for recovery.
Did you get any feedback along this line?

STEPHENSON: Well it was very good. I think that probably the personnel, for instance, I  
felt there were some people up there couldn't give the answers properly, 
they just didn’t have that much experience, but because they were going to be on
television they accepted and went up and did it. but the people who had the
answers, most of them were still down there working...and when those answers
came across,  sometimes I just sort of cringed a little bit because they weren’t
just exactly what we wanted them to say.

RON STEPHENSON TAPES page 2 tape 2

DEWALL: But didn't you think it had a reassuring impact on the community?

STEPHENSON: Oh yes. Overall it was good. but I think one of the things I'd do

in the future...or the media might do in the futures to come down to the
control headquarters (I think there was always a little question where authority
was on your part)and this is where we got into a lot of trouble latter on.
I mean the mayor would call up and you'd accept it from the mayor. naturally.
But. the mayor. this is an area I don't want it to go out. but he did. you know.
it was tough for us down there..

DEWALL:  Speaking of that. one simple question: does the mayor have
power to declare marshall law?

STEPHENSON: I got into enough trouble on that once. I'd better not comment.
The answer, of course, is he does not, as such. He does, however, by getting it
 through proper authorities. It was answered in that paper (article),
and he did have the authority there, but I was told by Gen. Corning and others
he actually does not have that authority, but he naturally could have it by simply
asking for it through Gen. Corning or the Governor, and he could get it.

DEWALL: This is very important, now. I want to refer to the second flood threat.
And the question is this: Do you think that the emotional warnings the Mayor and
Bill Duhamel gave on radio and TV the night of the second flood stirred panic
in the community?

STEPHENSON: I don't think it did at that time. I think it could have ,
I think it was right on the edge.

DEWALL: It should not have been handled that way?

STEPHENSON: I thinkthat ,I think, and I cann't say...I was in the same boat I was
concerned and  I was on the way down. I don't think I would have quite had the panic. and
would have tried to keep my voice a little more under control but still with an
urgency. Ithink it was a little unprofessional from the media standpoint. You
know. I just felt that it was a little bit unprofessional. You can't tell the
mayor how to talk. he was worried and nervous and upset   and what he said he meant
and he was sincere in it. and he did the right thing in my opinion. but you
have to be so careful how you say this or bring it out where it might be in print or any thing because
it can be misinterpreted so easily. 
Yes. I think he did the right thing with w at he had and the information he had
and with them telling us there was a wall of water coming down there. We didn't
know. I think on that basis he did the right thing.

DEWALL: WE go back to that matter of tone.

STEPHENSON: Right. now again. I think if another week had gone by and we'd had
another flood, I don't think the mayor would have actually done it that way.
How in the world are you going to train consecutive mayors and all the rest of the
people who might be doing this.

DEWALL: In the final analysis, do you believe the media must always have the
final responsibility for what it broadcasts?Even when emergency warnings involved.

STEPHENSON: I think the media has this responsibility, but I think the media, in
an emergency declared by the President has the responsiblity to be willing to
accept the final word of the authority in charge. In other words if it doesn'
happen to agree with your thinking... t


RON STEPHENSON TAPES page 3 of tape 2

DEWALL: Well, give me a specific example.

STEPHENSON: Well, I can't give you one exactly. But I"m saying for instance...

DEWALL: Now we"re not talking about an EBS situation.

STEPHENSON: Oh. you*re talking about later on.

DEWALL: Either before or after (EBS). But not during EBS becaise: that"s when
government is just using a station"S transmitting facilities.

STEPHENSON: My thought is this. Say a civil defense director has information
and the media announcer, or whoever is in charge up there, says well, I don't
really think it's that serious,and I'm not going to do it that way. Then I think
that director should have the final authority as to the intensity of the warning.

DEWALL: But he still hasn't got any control over the media.

STEPHENSON: He still hasn't got any control over it, but he'd only be  able to
do it because he asked him to do it. And I think he should be given that
authority over any announcer who might, now I'm not talking about you or
anybody else particularly, but I can visualize a guy sitting up there and having
his own ideas about civil defense...and who says I'm not going to go that way.
That director is sitting there saying we've got a problem, we've got a disaster.
and I want this information to go out.Like this. I think they should accept it

DEWALL:But a station still is responsible for what it broadcasts, even in that
situation.

STEPHENSON: How can you change it. I don't think the law allows you to change that. 

DEWALL: That would seem to indicate than an argument  for a firm procedural advance plan between the broadcast medium and civil defense.

STEPHENSON: Right. Now there you've said it. If the media itself will accept the
divil defense board's recommendation to get together to come up with a plan
that's acceptable to the civil defense board, fine.I can say that. But I can
see a time if there ever would be this clash, then I think the authority, under
an emergency of the president, should supercede if it came ever to that decision
the officials of the civil authority, whomever, it might be a joint meeting of
civil authority, it might be the mayor of county commission or council, or it
might be a meeting, then I think they should have that final 
decision as to how that information, general, as to how it's put out. Like on
a directive. Now I got, we got a lot of heat when we moved the media out of the
control room into another room. We got a lot of heat there. Bill was one of them.
But I feel that was the proper decision because there was great confusion in the
control room which we just can't have anymore.That wasn't only media, that was
a lot of other things.

DEWALL:Did the media perform beyond the call of duty, and could you envision a
emergency situation without the broadcasting industry?

STEPHENSON: I CAn't envision it without the mec broadcast media. It would be a 
pure utter terror and panic continually. We could never
have done what we did without it. I've so said to the FCC.I said it too the
national  broadcast magazine, and I -have done nothing but commend the media
and KOTA in particularfor the role they played in it.To me there just couldn'
be enough said about what it did. And the suffering and the saving of lives,
that hospital was evaculated in the middle of the night, you know, and all this
type of thing, and not a single loss of life there. And this was all helped by the
communications that we were able to establish to get the volunteers necessary
and all the other things.

RON STEPHENSON TAPES...page 4 of tape 2

DEWALL: Were there times when the lack of two-way radios made you rely on EBS
to give direct messages to rescue crews in the field.

STEPHENSON: Oh, I'm sure that many times when radios might have gone out or
things happened that might have interfered, they used transister radios. I
cleaned my store out over here. I sent someone over here, I said take every
transister radio you can that will work. And they did. They brought six of them
back. and we put them out right there, but we should have had a hundred.

DEWALL: Anything you'd care to comment on we may not have touched?

STEPHENSON: No, not really. I want to commend you personally for the job you did.
Disaster is more than the first night or the second. Disaster is recovery...and
the aid that they've had in panel meetings, discussions. Now if I could make a
suggestion to the media, to KOTA and others, I see where it might be a good idea
for once a week during the weeks immediatly following the disaster and the
recovery effort to have the same kind of a panel that you had, amaybe without
quite so  many people on it, who are knowledgable in the things that are
happening currently and a phone in type of thing that would keep the public a
little better informed on what"s happening every week for awhile...other than
direct news information that goes out or that picked up.Because you open up
a line of communication there to the public that in my opinion would be invaluable.